USSR eventually won the bronze after winning 2-0 against the young and inexperienced Brazilian team. The victory pleased no one at home: it was not noted that there was no improvement even on Olympic level – once again just a third place. Tactics, form – everything was criticized. Terrible team.
The ‘bronze’ team of 1976 Olympics: left to right: V. Kolotov-captain, V. Astapovsky, S. Reshko, A. Konkov, V. Veremeev, O. Blokhin, V. Matvienko, L. Buryak, V. Onishchenko, A. Minaev, V. Troshkin. According to Olympic rules, only those who actually played during the tournament received medals. V. Zvyagintzev, M. Fomenko, V. Fedorov, and L. Nazarenko got medals. Prokhorov and Kipiani did not. It was noted and mentioned in the Soviet press, as yet another bit of criticism: Lobanovsky did not have the decency to play David Kipiani just a few minutes, allowing the Georgian to get a medal. It was unfair. And truly was, but the outraged was only about Kipiani – Prokhorov was not mentioned at all. Apparently, it was fine for the reserve goalie not to play even a second.
The final was not great fun either – another tough, uninspired match, in which DDR overcome Poland 3-1.
Schade (14) scores the opening goal.
Montreal, 31st July, 1976

East Germany 3-1 (2-0) Poland

East Germany:
Croy, Lauck, Weise, Dörner, Kurbjuweit, Kische, Schade, Riediger (Bransch),Höfner, Lowe (Grobner), Hoffmann.

Poland:
Tomaszewski (Mowlik), Szymanowski, Wieczorek, Zmuda, Wawrowski, Maszczyk,Deyna, Kasperczak, Lato, Szarmach, Kmiecik.

Referee: Ramon Barreto (Uruguay)
Attendance: 71,617, Olympic Stadium

Scorers:
1-0 [ 7'] Schade; 2-0 [14'] Hoffmann; 2-1 [59'] Lato; 3-1 [79'] Höfner

There were no enthusiastic post-match commentaries and rightly so. It was observed that Poland struggled and decline seemingly settled. Deyna and Lato in particular were seemingly beyond their prime, but the rest of the team was apparently worse and not deserving even criticism. Well, Tomaszewsky, who was fantastic two years ago, had to be replaced at the final – a comment enough. Szarmach was the top scorer of the tournament with 6 goals – small consolation. Evidently, Poland was paying the heavy price for having small pool of good players: the heroes were getting old and new legs were unavailable.
DDR was organized, disciplined, and experienced – it was their regular national team and practically the same players who played at the 1974 World Cup. No surprises – it was dull, especially unattractive team, but in good condition and thorough. No stars, just regular team, dedicated to collective effort. It worked at the Olympics.
The Olympic champions plus two extra players (Kotte and Schnuphase): top, left to right: Walter (?) – assistant coach, Kische, Dorner, Riediger, Bransch, Grobner, Schade, Weber, Schnuphase, Georg Buschner – coach.
Middle: Kotte (?), Hoffmann, Croy, Grapentin, Lowe, Weise.
Bottom: Riedel, Hafner, Kurbjuweit, Lauck, Heider.
At the end of 1976 they were voted the team of the year in DDR, but outside home country the team attracted little interest. However, DDR was even better sample of the entirely collective football which was coming. No great individuals at all. And no fun, unfortunately.
Poland finished second – a team going downhill, it was judged.

Quarterfinals did not need even predictions – they were mere formality, considering the pairs. Michel Platini lost 0-4 – may be this is the best comment. USSR continued to display terrible form and barely managed to advance.
Brazil 4-1 Israel
Soviet Union 2-1 Iran
East Germany 4-0 France
Poland 5-0 North Korea
The semi-finals were the first real football to be played… potentially. Brazil had small chance to win against Poland – but it was before the match started. Poland was more likely winner – and they won. The other match was to be boring affair, DDR pretending to play and really allowing USSR to go ahead. Not so – DDR won, but it was not as sensational win as the Polish one four years back at the 1972 Olympics. The Soviets already displayed many problems, they were sluggish, rusty, and entirely clueless. They were also surprisingly conservative, returning to the scared football they played before Dinamo Kiev’s ‘revelation’. Even against obviously weak opponents Lobanovsky preferred to field 5 defenders. It was plain stupid by now: the whole concept of hoping Blokhin to outrun defenders and score – there was no variety, no back-up plan, if this doesn’t work… and it was not working, for it was quickly grasped by the other teams and even pathetic opponent was able to block Blokhin by keeping a defender to shadow him everywhere. DDR did not play particularly good – they were not able to, for they were quite limited squad – but they were fit enough, and running decided the match in their favour – 2-1.
Poland – Brazil above. May be this was the most attractive match at the Olympics… by default. Poland was the better squad and confidently won. Bellow – USSR – DDR. Clumsy fighting, ugly physical game, in which the ball appeared to be some alien object to both teams. Kolotov and Onishchenko (in dark shirts) wrestle with Hafner and Kische.
Football was not exactly the strongest quality of either team. Minaev kind of trying to trick a German.

The rest of the finalists were not really powerful and on top of it, they were reduced by three – Nigeria, Ghana, and Zambia withdraw as part of the general African boycott against New Zealand, which committed a crime – played rugby matches with outlawed South Africa. The rest of the African countries wanted New Zealand to be banned from the Olympics; it was not; the Africans boycotted the games; the football tournament was left with only 13 participants. Brazil, France, Spain – those were the strongest among the rabble, although not much at all. Young players without professional contracts, some playing 2nd and 3rd division football (the Spaniards) were collected in the ‘strong’ teams. Brazil was coached by respected name – and the players were selected on the basis of promise: as a future national players. France was similar, and to a point – Spain. Yet, nothing big and strong at the present. The rest of the finalists is hardly worth mentioning – Cuba (replacing Uruguay, after they decided to withdraw from the tournament and Argentina declined to replace them as well), Mexico, Guatemala, Iran, North Korea, Israel (probably because there were no Arabic countries reaching the Olympics), and hosts – Canada. The only thing interesting about the finals is really trivia: the players, who became big (or smaller) stars in the following years – Edinho, Carlos (Brazil), Platini, Amisse, Rouyer, Fernandez (France), Eskandarian (Iran), Hugo Sanchez (Mexico), Arconada, Juanito (Spain). Not even a full squad…
The predictable East European walkover to predictable final happened not to be so easy: it looked like nobody was in decent form. Cuba nibbled a point out of Poland – 0-0. The revelation of 1974 managed to go ahead after 3-2 win over Iran. Not a hint of supremacy…
USSR barely won their match with Canada by 2-1. France was unable to win against Israel… Platini vs nobody: 1-1. The preliminary groups were shallow – the most interesting part of them were the complaints – even the Soviets complained from the condition of the grounds the hosts provided. USSR, however, used the state of the ‘stadiums’ as an excuse for their obviously bad form and lack of ideas. Lobanovsky was good at complaining – to cover his back.
Terrible tournament from the beginning: remember the top goalscorer and one of the most impressive players at the 1974 World Cup? Grzegorz Lato? He alone should have been enough to beat Cuba with 4-5 goals difference… but it was 0-0 at the final whistle.

The Olympic Games kind of confirmed the end of individuals, if anybody cared to follow the tournament. By 1976 Olympic football was losing its attractiveness even for the Socialist countries. In the West it was considered the domain of East Europe states and their ‘amateurs’ – it was not important to follow tainted and hardly entertaining competition. It was a sham, confirmed once again just by looking at the Soviet roster: 10 players were listed as university students (8 of them attending Physical Education departments – the usual bogus education for Eastern European sportsmen); 1 was listed as just graduated from University; 1 was a military man, but unclear was he a soldier or an officer; 1 was ‘technician’; and 4 – ‘educators’. The last group was especially murky in defining – school teachers? College instructors? University professors? Or just sports instructors in some factory? It was all bogus, so it did not matter really – the most suspect part was the case of the two CSKA players in the squad: since it was the club of the Army, normally players were militarized and given officer’s ranks. Astapovsky was listed as army man, but Nazarenko was listed as university student. Students excepted, no one else was probably even aware of his ‘profession’ – and, please, don’t ask where was their ‘working place’. But this was familiar for a long time and not even curious any more. More interesting was the absence of the fresh European champions – Czechoslovakia did not qualify for the Olympics. It looked like the priority was the normal national team – a change becoming somewhat visible by now, and entirely new East European approach. USSR officially separated their A team from the Olympic one – different coaches, different players. In 1975 Konstantin Beskov was the Olympic team coach and Spartak Moscow was the ‘base’ of the formation. There was no clear border, though – players were taken from one team to another, depending on whims of the national team coach. At the end the scheme was changed once again – for the Olympics Beskov was replaced by Lobanovsky, and there was no longer unique Olympic team – the national team players simply became Olympic team players. Messy affair even in purely sporting terms: what was the point of using one bunch of players during qualifications only to discard them when the finals start? No wonder motivation was lost.
One of the original Olympic teams in 1975: from left: V. Filatov, V. Utkin, V. Sakharov, A. Minaev, V. Zvyagintzev, V. Hadzipanagis, N. Osyanin, A. Maksimenkov, A. Prokhorov, E. Lovchev – captain.
The whole idea of using particular clubs as the ‘base’ of national formation, with just a few additional players, was crazy enough – and probably concocted by Lobanovsky, who used practically the whole Dinamo Kiev in the national team. Beskov may be disliked the idea, but that was the order. It did not work – Spartak Moscow was in shabby form – so in the team above only 3 players came from Spartak. Other things did not work either: Zvyagintzev, Prokhorov, and Lovchev were just taken away from Beskov by Lobanovsky. Most surprisingly the ethnic Greek – Hadzipanagis – was permitted to go to Greece and play professionally there: no Olympics for him, but it was especially stupid move by the Soviets: their national formations were struggling and they lost carelessly a very good player on top of it.
Anyway, when Lobanovsky arrived, with his assistants Bazilevich and Oleg Morozov (he was not attached to Lobanovsky’s usual thinktank – most likely Morozov was imposed on Lobanovsky, which never makes for good and healthy team athmosphere), the players shown above disappeared: only Prokhorov, Zvygintzev (by now also playing for Dinamo Kiev), Minaev, and Fedorov went to Montreal. The rest was familiar… 11 Dinamo Kiev players plus reserves from here and there. It was the national team again – Aleksander Prokhorov (Spartak) and Vladimir Astapovsky (CSKA) were already the goalies of the A team, since Rudakov was in bad form. Leonid Nazarenko (CSKA) was already used in the A team as well. Vladimir Fedorov (Pakhtakor Tashkent) and David Kipiani (Dinamo Tbilisi) were also perspective national team players. Only Aleksander Minaev (Spartak Moscow) was so-so – apparently, in good form, but not a player Lobanovsky was going to use much. The rest of the squad perhaps does not need mentioning… the starting eleven of Kiev and a substitute as well – Viktor Zvyagintzev, Viktor Matvienko, Stefan Reshko, Vladimir Troshkin, Mikhail Fomenko, Anatoly Konkov, Leonid Buryak, Vladimir Veremeev, Viktor Kolotov, Oleg Blokhin, and Vladimir Onishchenko. Yes, the heroes from 1975 – but in 1976 they were playing weak football, lost the European Championship ¼ finals. Dinamo Kiev was struggling and underperforming, but the same players were really a disaster when playing as USSR. Even tactics were changed – by now it was no longer fast attacking football, but cautious, defensive oriented game, depending on occasional counter-attacks. All balls were to go to Blokhin, in hope he will outrun opposite defenders and score. It was too plain and predictable to bring success, but that was USSR conducted by Lobanovsky. It was expected to win the Olympics – mostly because the only relatively strong opposition were Poland (minus some players gone professional in the West, most important absence – Robert Gadocha) and DDR (considered in a slump already and a puppet team, ready to give victory to the ‘Big Brother’ without even a pretense of a fight).

It was mainly matches at home, ending in ties:
2-2 against Poland.
Deyna shoots, Varadin is late to block, Viktor getting ready to dive, but the ball seemingly is off target.
A penalty against Poland. Tomaszewski protested the penalty against Gorgon, but he saved Masny’s kick.
Jozef Moder tackled by Hungarian defender in Budapest. If anything, the match with Hungary was played on better pitch, but 1-1.
Fighting the mud along with DDR to another tie. Weisse strikes somehow, Gogh is too late to prevent.
After the mud came the snow and Romania.
Pivarnik (left) and Masny unable to penetrate Romanian defense.
Pivarnik in attack – never mind the snow, he displayed the qualities of modern full back – that is, joined the strikers.
Svehlik escapes from Angelini’s tackle.
Nehoda strikes and Sandu can only watch.
But – 2-2 at the end.
And from the snow to the lake:
Dobias, Sajanek, Matvienko, and Konkov in the water just about a month before their official meeting in the European ¼ finals. CSSR – USSR: 2-2.
Not pretty pictures, not pretty results… why bother following Czechoslovakia in their fantastic friendlies against unexciting opponents? But it was in these games the team solidified and built character.
Panenka was praised in the snow: commentators said that he finally started playing for the national team the way he played for his club. He was not English-type player, so it was really something to get noticed when playing in impossible conditions. Closer attention should have been paid to development of Czechoslovakia in the mud, swamps, and snow – they were not winning, true. They were missing penalties, true. When summer arrived, they managed ties again – but won at the end in extra time and by penalty shoot-out. To my mind the string of friendlies was the key to the Czechoslovakian success.
One thing after major tournament is ‘lessons’… what new brought the tournament. The European finals actually brought nothing new. No innovations. Rather, it was obvious that total football spread and it was the norm. The formula of success was building well rounded team capable of playing total football and preserving excellent condition. However, hardly any new major stars emerged – the new European champions were just a lesser version, yet, very competent, of the great innovators from few years back. CSSR truly depended on collective game, more or less every player participated equally, and the importance of the defenders was reinforced: it was not the strikers scoring the important oals, but back-liners, surprising the opposition. The game was becoming tougher, though – traditionally mellow and technical team, CSSR suddenly displayed gritty pressure on the whole pitch. It was confirmed that not individual stars, but collective effort made a winning team – the age of great individuals was seemingly over.

The last sense of repeating the past in the championship full of repetitions: Czechoslovakia evoked Poland of 1974. There were important similarities – both countries surprised the world by eliminating England. Both were expected to expire quickly after incidental advance, but both stunned the world by continuing ahead with great performances. Both countries carefully and slowly built their teams. Both had great and long lasting head coaches. Both had capable assistant coaches, becoming famous on their own. Both countries were not exactly innovators, but adapted very well useful elements of total football into their game, in accord with the abilities and peculiarities of the available players.
Yet, they were not identical and differences were just as many: Czechoslovakia had old reputation and Poland did not. Czechoslvakia was considered - and rightly so – in a decline since 1970. Poland was so unimportant, decline was not really a consideration – rather, then came out from nowhere. Czechoslovakia managed a revival. Traditionally, Czechoslovakian club football was stronger than the Polish one, and the pool of talent was more numerous and had more depth. Poland depended on lightning attacks, but the Czechoslovaks employed various tactics – they were very confident in defense; were able to change the tempo – or to adjust to changing tempo; they were more patient and careful.
Overall, both countries had strong and well balanced teams, with strong stars in every line. To a point, the Poles had better strikers. To a point, the Czechoslovaks had more dangerous defenders participating in attacks and often scoring the goals. However, the best advantage of both countries was that hardly anybody took them seriously – until it was too late. They were able to become lethal out of sight.
So what happened? By 1972 the Czechoslovaks were still licking their wounds from the disastrous 1970 World Cup. A new team was needed – and there was none. Meantime Poland won the 1972 Olympic games, and after that the squad was just finely tuned and shaped with careful additions. CSSR started from scratch at that year: Vaclav Jezek and appointed head coach of the national team. Jozef Venglos was made his assistant. Both coaches were peculiar for East Europe: Jezek came straight from Holland, where he coached ADO Den Haag since 1969. He managed to take his humble club to third place during the time of great Ajax. If anything, he learned about total football right from the source. Venglos did not even start his coaching career in Czechoslovakia – he ventured into coaching in 1966 and in Australia, eventually becoming the coach of the national team. He returned to his native land in 1969 and in 1973 he became the coach of Slovan Bratislava. He was still the club coach in 1976, combining club work and the national team. It is important to mention that Slovan were strong during that time – and the credit goes to Venglos. Slovan became the backbone of the national team with mainly Slovak additional players, for those were the years of Slovak domination anyway. Vencel, Pivarnik, Ondrus, Jozef Capkovic, Svehlik, Masny, Gogh became European champions, but a whole bunch of other Slovan players were also used in the national team between 1972 and 1976. Add Petras and Jurkemik (both Inter Bratislava), Pollak (Kosice), Dobias (Spartak Trnava). Add Dusan Herda, who played in Prague, but was ethnic Slovak. And this was not the whole list either – Jezek and Venglos slowly shaped their team, using many players. Some were young unknowns; some were established, but never called before; some were old, even ‘discarded’ – Frantisek Vesely, for instance. The end result was well rounded team, with equally strong reserves, and a bunch of useful players with national team experience, who stayed back simply for lack of available space in the ‘big’ squad. Jezek and Venglos new how precious is experience in the national team, even when sitting on the bench – they were not afraid to invite to the finals few players ‘for the future’, who played little so far – Biros, Herda, Stambachr. It was clear they were not going to play even a minute, but… when Stambachr became Olympic champion in 1980, and was a key player of the team, he already was formal European champion from 1976. It was long term approach – and Czechoslovakia was better suited for that than Poland, limited by smaller pool of talent.
The whole time of rebuilding Czechoslovakia was off the radar – the missed the 1974 World Cup. The team showed teeth in 1975 – the main team was more or less made and it was the right time to build confidence and shape tactics. It was a clever move – a number of friendlies were played, avoiding undue attention and close scrutiny: matches with middle-strength teams. Strong enough for tough games and experimenting; yet not world powers. It was grave mistake nobody was watching: Czechoslovakia – in my opinion – became smooth working machine exactly in these games. Results did not matter much – it was making the team experienced, versatile, and confident. It was at that time Antonin Panenka, playing for lowly Bohemians Prague, became a key national player. The preparatory work was missed… but who cared for friendlies with DDR and Switzerland in those years? The road to victory was silent – and brought great results at the end.
The masterminds of the European champions Jezek and Venglos watch carefully from the bench their team against Switzerland.
The last goal scored by Masny against Sweden – 4-0, a rare Czechoslovakian win in a friendly.
Lone striker Nehoda surrounded by Swiss players – hardly looking like future European champions at play.
Pivarnik clears the ball with his hands and Risi scored the penalty – 1-1 with the Swiss.

Final. Bets on West Germany, partly because they played well against Yugoslavia, partly because it was difficult to discard Beckenbauer, partly because Czechoslovakia’s ‘luck’ was bound to end. One thing was strange, though: the finals attracted smaller crowds than the semi-finals. Yugoslavia’s elimination was the main reason, but still it was strange: Holland – Czechoslovakia was attended by more fans than the final deciding who will be the European champion. 70 000 went to Crvena zvezda stadium to watch Yugoslavia – West Germany; less than half the number went back to the same stadium to see the final. In a way, the victory of the Germans was in the bag and it was not even interesting to witness… CSSR had only one change from the previous match – Svehlik instead the suspended Pollak. The Germans were pretty much the same too – Dieter Muller was a starter this time, taking the place of disappointing Danner. The match started and the goals quickly followed – but they were not in the Czechoslovakian net. By the 25th minute it was 2-0 for CSSR! It was a mirror image of the semi-final against Yugoslavia – the Germans suffered heavy assaults, resulting in 2 early goals.
Svehlik scoring the first goal of the final in the 8th minute.
Full backs defend, right? It all depends – Vogts tries to defend, but Karol Dobias – 2-0 in the 25th minute.
This time the Germans responded much quicker than they did against Yugoslavia: they scored in the 28th minute. And it was Dieter Muller again – the magic name continued to work, West Germany truly found her new Muller. Or so appeared. The first half ended 2-1. It was entertaining, fast 45 minutes of attacking football, both sides quite equally dangerous and the Czechoslovakians missing golden opportunity for a third goal.
The second goal was mostly German – they attacked constantly, pressing the Czechoslovakians in defense. Ivo Viktor had to work hard, but he managed.
Fogts, Moder, Beckenbauer and the ball…
Both teams fought well, CSSR’s defense surviving constant attacks and it looked like no fresh goals were to materialize. The public started leaving the stadium – there was a minute left, the match was practically over, but there was a good reason to stay to the final whistle when Germans were playing… Holzenbein scored with a header precisely in the 89th minute. Remember Bayern – Atletico Madrid from the spring of 1974? Regular time ended 2-2, thus, every match of the finals went into extra time! Extraordinary!
Overtime, however, was lesser fun – both teams looked tired and cautious. Changes were made early – once again Flohe came on the pitch at the beginning of the second half (replacing Wimmer). Then Bongartz replaced Beer in the 80th minute – Schon tried to put some vim into his team, when Czechoslovakia waited and used clearly defensive tactic – another defender, Jurkemik, replaced Svehlik in the 79th minute. There was no room for fresh legs during the extra time, except for CSSR – and this time they decided on striker: Vesely replaced Dobias in the 94th minute. Nothing happened, though – overtime ended and penalty shoot-out was to decide the European Championship. Always a gamble. Still, West Germany had better odds – better goalkeeper; better shooters; iron nerves. Fate was playing a joke of repetitions this year… the third one was during the penalties. They went one for one, nobody missing, until Uli Hoeness took the forth for the Germans and… shoot the ball over the crossbar. Remember him missing a penalty in the 1974 World Cup match against Poland? Now again. Since Czechoslovakia had the first penalty, their last had the chance to decide the championship. Antonin Panenka kick the ball and it was 5-3! The Germans lost. It was a penalty to be discussed for years – until now. The ‘cheeky’ penalty, the risk Panenka took… he was and is criticized for his ‘casual’ approach, seen as carelessness by some. Yet, it was the winning goal.
Light ball right in the middle of Maier’s net. If the goalie did not move, the ball was to bounce off him and away… but goalkeepers always plunge aside. Was it undue risk? Was it a cool calculation? Panenka leans to the former in his interviews. Well, it is easy to speak after the fact.
So why the fuss over Panenka’s penalty? Well, it looks like the same as the one Jurkemik delivered a bit earlier. Except Jurkemik really kicked the ball, and Panenka did not.
Never mind, though: thanks to Panenka CSSR won!
The happy goalscorer runs euphoric.
And Czechoslvakia, already dressed in Germans shirts, lifted the European cup. Happy winners of the 5th European championship – nobody managed to win the tournament twice so far! New European champions again!
Beograd, June 20, Crvena zvezda
Czechoslovakia 2-2 West Germany [aet]
[Svehlík 8, Dobiás 25; D.Müller 28, Hölzenbein 89]
[ref: Gonella (Italy); att: 35,000]
Czechoslovakia win 5-3 on penalties
[Masny 1-0, Bonhof 1-1; Nehoda 2-1, Flohe 2-2; Ondrus 3-2, Bongarts 3-3;
Jurkemik 4-3, U.Hoeneß 4-3 (over the crossbar); Panenka 5-3]
Czechoslovakia: Viktor, Pivarník, Ondrus, Capkovic, Gögh, Dobiás (94 Vesely),Móder, Panenka, Masny, Svehlík (79 Jurkemik), Nehoda
West Germany: Maier, Vogts, Schwarzenbeck, Beckenbauer, Dietz, Wimmer (46 Flohe), Bonhof, Beer (80 Bongartz), U.Hoeneß, D.Müller, Hölzenbein
German losers… what else, since second place was actually a major step down for the reigning world champions. From left: Beckenbauer, Maier, Schwarzenbeck, D. Muller, Wimmer, Dietz, Holzenbein, Bonhof, Beer, Vogts, Hoeness.
Brand new European Champions! Top, left to right: Vaclav Jezek – coach, Ladislav Jurkemik, Anton Ondrus, Dusan Galis, Alexander Vencel, Antonin Panenka, Ivo Viktor, Jozef Capkovic, Marian Masny, Pavol Biros, Zdenek Nehoda, Jozef Venglos – assistant coach.
Bottom: Miloslav Kundrat – team’s doctor, Ladislav Petras, Karol Dobias, Jan Pivarnik, Lubomir Knapp, Jan Svehlik, Koloman Gogh, Jaroslav Pollak, Jozef Moder, Vlastimil Ruzicka – masseur.
Oh, well – almost the team: L. Knapp did not make the final selection, but Jozef Barmos, Dusan Herda, Frantisek Vesely, Frantisek Stambachr, and Premysl Bicovsky did. From them only Vesely played at the finals. He was 33 years old at the time – and still enough playing years ahead of him, as it turned out.