The 'European' Group A started with Italian 'home' advantage – meeting West Germany in Buenos Aires. It was unusual match and records mislead: judging by the German squad and substitutes, it was attacking World Champions and defensive Italians. Holzenbein, Rummenigge, and Fischer reinforced by Beer in the second half. But it was defensive West Germany, concerned only with preventing Italy from attacking. Only Fischer was a striker during the game. On the other hand Italy did not look like Italy – it was attacking minded team, with once again superb Bettega.

Bettega goes beyond helpless Maier and... scores? Unfortunately, no... the Germans survived the Italian assault. The match ended in a scoreless draw, angering fans, specialists, and journalists. Italy deserved to win and it was clear by now that West Germany was not capable of any improvement. To some this was the end of the mighty Germans, but most were cautious: the Germans were still very much in the game. Awful team to watch, but... German.

At the same time in Cordoba Holland came back not only to life, but to the very exciting football they were remembered for. Austria was completely destroyed – and not because they played bad. Holland was simply superior by far. The Austrians had no reason to change their so far exciting team, but the Dutch came with almost entirely re-made team. Schrijvers was back between the posts, injured Neeskens was out, as well as Suurbier and Rijsbergen. Haan, Jansen, and Willie van de Kerkhof in midfield; Rene van de Kerkhof, Rep, and Rensenbrink and attack. The biggest changes were in the defensive line, where only Krol remained firm. The rest were former deep reserves – Poortvliet, Wildschut, and Ernie Brandts, who did not appear at all in the earlier matches. And he was the most important addition to the team. An enigma of a player – before the finals Brandts was listed as a striker, but in the official team list he was listed as defender. And what kind of defender? Central or full-back? Universal and flexible player, fit to plug any hole, it seems and Happel obviously found the magic player for his idea of fluid and tactically changing football. Brandts was everywhere, invigorating the team on one hand and surprising the opposition, concerned with the big names, on the other. His presence immediately brought results – Brands scored in the 6th minute. The Rensenbrink converted a penalty in the 35th, and Rep finished Austria a minute later.

Hans Krankl surrounded by no-nosence Dutch defenders. One of the best strikers at the 1978 World Cup was neutralized and the ball was going in the other direction. Holland scored two more goals in the second half. Austria managed to return one in the 70th minute, but it was not even saving grace – Holland retaliated two minutes later with their fifth goal. 5-1. Holland was back, Austria was out, as expected. Nothing was decided yet, but the huge victory tipped the scales heavily in Dutch favour. As for Austria, may it was a sour point to be destroyed by fellow Austrian... but such is life.

The second leg was expected not so much to clear the air, but rather to make the group entirely unpredictable to the end. Italy had the edge against Austria, but curiously the match was not exciting. Somehow Italy returned to its familiar careful game. Austria obviously tried to repair her team, but not having enough depth, there was little to be done – Kurt Jara was replaced by Walter Schachner. Uninspired match, in which Paolo Rossi scored the only goal in the 13th minute.

Parity: Bettega shoots, Koncilia saves. Nobody shined. It should be noted that Paolo Rossi so far was making good impression, but he was not firm regular and not at all the star he became few years later. Potential star – yes. Scoring the winning goal was good promise for the future. As for the present, Italy clinched 2 points and remained a possible candidate for playing at the final. Austria was out of the game, as predicted and expected. The match itself remained in memory, but not for football. By 1978 exchanging shirts after a game was established tradition, to which even Communist countries subscribed. But the fans in Buenos Aires saw something entirely different:

Bruno Pezzey and Francesco Graziani exchanged shorts! Strange innovation, which remains unique – the example was not followed. Perhaps not because comes close to striptease, but because shorts, unlike shirts, are less distinct. And this was the long lasting moment of this match.

Holland – West Germany generated hype: a replay of the 1974 final, with much at stake for both teams and expected desire for revenge among the Dutch. But it tough game lacking greatness and without stronger side. Happel fielded the same team used in the previous match – seemingly, he found the right chemistry at last. Schon, however, made changes, evoking 1974, when he was still searching the winning squad at the same stage. Fischer, Flohe, and Zimmermann were out, Holzenbein was moved back to midfield, Beer was a starter, plus Abramczik and Dieter Muller. Twice the Germans went ahead and twice the Dutch equalized shortly after the German goals. Maier got yellow card, something very rare for him, but Holland ended with 10 men, for the substitute Nanninga managed in 10 minutes on the pitch to get yellow and then red card. But the result remained.

The picture somehow tells it all: tough fight for every ball, but none better. Rep and Holzenbein here in equal, indecisive duel. 2-2.

Thus, nothing was decided to the last round, except that Austria was out of the race. The Germans still had a chance to reach the final – it was expected that they will beat disinterested by now Austria, but they had to score lots of goals. Not impossible, perhaps with little brotherly help by the 'other Germans'. Holland had the edge with superior goal-difference and a tie could be enough. Italy needed victory – nothing else worked for them.

Austria was the big surprise: contrary to any expectations, they were not only eager to play, but outplayed West Germany. It was close match, the Germans scoring first. Then – the turning point, becoming emblematic an symbolic for the German team of 1978: Berti Vogts scored in his own net.

Berti Vogts on his knees in front of the Austrians after doing the job for them. West Germany down – the photo pretty much represents the case of the awful West German team.

Krankl made it 2-1 in the 66th minute, but Holzenbein equalized the next minute. Three minute before the end it was over – Krankl scored one more. West Germany not only lost the opportunity to defend the title, but were out of top four teams. They did not win a single match in the second round and finished above Austria only thanks to better goal-difference. It was the worst ever performance by West German team – or at least that was the perception.

Holland and Italy played in front of 73 000. And they were not disappointed – contrary to 'common sense', Italy was attacking relentlessly and the
Dutch were in defense. Neeskens was finally fit and back in the squad. Happel once again changed his tactical scheme, starting with 3-4-3, but there was small and dangerous at first additional touch – Neeskens was assigned to shadow Paolo Rossi. It did not work well – Bettega was the main danger, not Rossi, and Holland lost creative player in the bargain. But things were readjusted eventually. Not without trouble, though... Brandts scored, but in the wrong net. In the 18th minute Italy was leading 1-0. There was obvious weakness between the goalposts too... and the first substitute was made in the 21st minute: Jongbloed replaced Schrijvers.

Holland managed to equalize only in the second half – in one fantastic turn of events, Brandts was again the goalscorer. This time in the right net.

Ernie Brandts, the hero of the match and not only: how many players score all the goals for both teams?

It was clear that Holland was going to play for a tie – Rep stepped out in the 65th minute, replaced by a defender, van Kraay. Holland controlled the game better by now, Italy was losing steam and eventually the Dutch scored again. Haan this time. It was easier to keep the result now – the match ended 2-1 for Holland and they were going to the final for a second time. Deservingly so – Italy did not score even a goal against Holland, Brandts scoring for them.

1. Holland 2 1 0 9-4 5

2. Italy 1 1 1 2-2 3

3. West Germany 0 2 1 4-5 2

4. Austria 1 0 2 4-8 2

Holland to the final and Italy to the small final – considering overall performance, fair table.

A little pause before the second round started – used to comment, speculate, analyze, and predict. Pundits paradise. So far, political issues were taking secondary place – fears of terrorist attacks, kidnapping, and mass protests staged during games did not materialize. Security was tight, but as far as there were no problems for the teams, it was so big deal. Most complains were game related: namely, the poor state of the pitches. There was no much grass left as soon as game started, the surfaces were rough. May be the Argentines did not really prepared the stadiums, but people did not really take into account an objective problem – the World Cup was played in the midst of South American winter. European stadiums were mostly mud in January – why expecting different at the same season in Argentina?


The rest of scandalous hype was related to accidents and strange decisions. Poland had appointed a psychologist to her national team. A novelty back in the 1970s, which puzzled observers – the role of the psychologist was unclear and Jacek Gmoch failed to explain the need for such specialist. Which was 26-years old female... today the gossip columns will have a field day with such 'news', but in the 70s the only problem was 'what for?' Much more was made of the new captain's armband of West Germany: Berti Vogts was no longer 'captain', but 'team leader'. Which is 'fuhrer' in German...

'First among equals', the new position was explained, but photos like this one evoked memories of one other German Fuhrer. And Berti grew a moustache... And the ominous armband was introduced in Argentina, full with old German Nazis, and called Fascist state, because of the practices of the military Junta. Bad choice and poor taste. Food for critics.

Then - the doping scandal. It was the first time player was found using dope, so the whole thing went through the roof. Willie Johnston of Scotland failed the test, maintained his innocence, but fact is fact, and the Scottish authorities immediately sent him home.

Willie Johnston arriving in UK – and immediately surrounded by Police. The same way he left Argentina – and at gun point, for good measure. The scandal was huge in part because it was practically impossible to defend the player – Johnston had long history of misdeeds, pranks, and disciplinary fouls. Suspensions were frequent, the Scottish Federation was against his playing for the national team for years – a scapegoat he may be was, but his history spoke heavily against him. Besides, Scotland had to pacify FIFA – and quickly. Luckily, they lost the match after which Johnston was tested positive. With his expulsion, Scotland prevented punishment of the whole team. Yet, the case was widely commented – it was proving suspicions of doping, which existed for many years.

The last outcry was about favouritism of the hosts. It was the schedule by which Argentina played later than her opponents. It was the 'gentle' help of the referees – the controversial penalty given against Marius Tresor and the expulsion of the two key players of Hungary. The Hungarians were particularly irritated – in their view, the red cards of Nyliasi and Toroczik were deliberately given and practically destroyed the chances of the team in the next games. The weird case of the missing French kit, forcing the team to borrow jerseys from a local club was another unbecoming to World Cup finals incident, but in view of more serious problems, this was trivial.

The rest was directly concerning the game. It was observed that so far the general level of football was higher than four years ago. There were no outsiders – Mexico failed, but even their play was not so fantastically incompetent, as Zaire's in 1974. Iran and Tunisia were more than pleasant surprises and both teams were pretty equal to the rest. They had good chances even to go further. South American teams were also at par with the Europeans – unlike 1974, when all South Americans were clearly outdated. Peru was particularly good – may be even the best playing team at the first stage. Other good news were Austria, Italy, and France – not only strong, but pleasant to watch. France was the team observers were sorry to see eliminated. To a point, Scotland was the other team going home too early – but it was mostly thanks to their last match with Holland.

On the negative side was the collective underperformance of the favourites – Argentina, Brazil, West Germany, and Holland struggled. None was convincing, everyone displayed severe problems and much needed changes and adjustments. There was not team at all appearing head and shoulders above the rest, as it was Holland in 1974. The mega-stars did not shine at all. There were no bright newcomers either, bursting at the finals, like the Polish players four years earlier. No tactical innovations were observed, The only surprise was perhaps Italy, with her untypical attacking approach.

Too little for a world finals. Although a lot was said about collective game, no longer needing individual stars, the absence of great figures was upsetting: it was hard to distinguish players and worse – there were no one really influencing his team, let alone been exciting to watch. It looked like the big names of the sport were either fading, or not in form. Which contributed to unconvincing performance by the favourites. The best players so far were quite a strange group:

At a glance, the big favourites were not represented at all – only Ruud Krol was selected, which still was weird, for Holland did not play well so far. On the other hand three players already finished, for their teams were eliminated Dhiab, Hellstrom, and Jordan. It was alarming that eliminated teams had more impressive players than those going ahead. The midfielders were entirely Peruvian, recognition of perhaps the most consistent team of the first phase, but... it looked like secondary players were outplaying those who should have been really shining – and that in midfield, considered the most important line for years. The Peruvians were fairly big stars, yet, a second tier when compared to the likes of Rivelino, Neeskens, Bonhof, to name a few of those who failed to impress. Italy was strongly represented and it was a team seen as one in the making, not yet ready for anything big. Same with Pezzey. And what was the most alarming when looking at the selection: no really strong team emerged so far – if there was, it should have been represented in every line, like it was in 1974.

Meantime struggling favourites and surprisingly strong outsiders resulted in weird continental divide of the semi-final groups – one South American, the other European. South Americans, as Rinus Michels professed before the finals, were quite strong – all three South American teams reached the next level. The forth team in the group was Poland – but judging by the way they played, it was considered the obvious outsider of the group. Even if miracle happened and Poland suddenly improved, the combined strength of the South Americans would have crushed the Poles. Peru, darlings so far, lacked depth – they depended on few irreplaceable players. Besides, Peru had no secrets for South American teams. Enthusiasm may inspire them, but it was unlikely Peru could finish at first or second place. They were dangerous for the favourites mostly because they were able to influence the final standings – and nothing but playing for the World Cup would do Brazil and Argentina. Which were considered the obvious favourites in the group. Argentina played a little bit better than Brazil so far, had the home advantage, had enormous ambition, but Brazil was ambitious too and between such rivals anything was possible. Which was probably the biggest fear of the Argentinians, although there was no regret for ending in this group and not in the other: over there the predators were more, all playing tough European football with vicious defenders.

The other group immediately evoked the final of 1974 – Holland and West Germany had all scores to settle. True, neither team was nearly as good as they were in 1974, and West Germany was particularly bland so far. Holland was a bit more vulnerable, because of the presence of Austria – it was like playing twice against difficult German team, something the current Dutch team was unlikely to survive. Austria was seen similarly to Peru, but because of the making of their group, the outsider. It was mostly a matter of experience and the other teams surely knew how to handle an exciting, but smaller team. Austria was able to decide who ends there, though – Holland was expected to suffer. Italy was pleasant surprise so far, but the team was judged still in early phase of development, immature, and therefore not a real contender. May be at the next World Cup, but not now. Between Holland and West Germany, the reigning world champions had some advantage, but small one. However, the favourites had to improve quite a lot...

Which applied to all favourites – hopes, of course, became strong as ever: that now the big teams will start finally playing real football. Especially Brazil. Especially Holland. Who else, if not the Germans. No way Argentina would miss their best chance. Just wait and see what Kempes, Zico, Rensenbrink, and Bonhof are really capable of. Tomorrow.

In retrospect, Holland's beginning of the 1978 campaign is usually described as 'slow', the convenient term for 'bad'. From a distance, the first match was won confidently – 3-0. It was also considered the easiest – against the outsider Iran. But Holland faced competent team, which was not intimidated at all and was equal most of the time. Holland struggled, lacked creativity, and won thanks to experience and will power. Happel said many times that he wanted not generals, but soldiers – and soldiers he got. They run a lot, fought a lot...

Will power and physicality won the match – even in a single captured moment it shows. Nobody was really happy – Holland got 2 points, but the team was obviously in trouble and urgent changes were needed. The problems were not lost on Happel – he used 3-4-3 scheme in the first match, with Rijsbergen in the middle of defense, Suurbier on the right, and Krol on the left. Haan, Jansen, Neeskens, and Willy van de Kerkhof in midfied, and Rene van de Kerkhof, Rep, and Rensenbrink in attack. Schrijvers between the goalposts. In other words, the best players, those expected not just to start, but to dominate. But there was no chemistry and actually the performance of many was inadequate. Rensenbrink scored all the goals, but he failed as successor of Cruyff, and the goals are even misleading: two were scored from penalties.

Against Peru Happel started with different tactic – 4-3-3 – and different players. Jongbloed; Suurbier and Poortvliet full back, and Krol – Rijsbergen central defenders; Neeskens, Jansen, and Willy van de Kerkhof in midfield; Rene van de Kerkhof, Haan, and Rensenbrink strikers. During the game Rensenbrink moved slightly back, attempting again playmaking role, and Will van de Kerkhof played more like left winger, with Haan as centre-forward. Holland, facing enthisiastic and well prepared Peruvian squad, again did not play well.

Krol looking in control of the ball – and the game, but the match was equal. Perhaps Peru played more dangerously, contrary to the photo, and Holland was lucky to survive a goalless tie. The attack was perhaps the biggest trouble and Happel already tried to improve it: Nanninga came twice already, replacing Rene van de Kerkhof in the first match, and Neeskens in the second.The little known player, practically a debutant at 29 years of age, changed absolutely nothing. Rep came back in the second half against Peru, replacing Rene van de Kerkhof – and nothing. Holland was running out of substitutes, already exhausting he striking options.

Since nothing was decided between the last match, Holland looked better on paper than on the field. Scotland was the most dangerous opponent for the Dutch, traditionally having difficulties against British teams. Holland was in much better position – Scotland needed a win by at least 3 goals difference to eliminate Holland, almost impossible task. At least on theory – on the pitch Scotland suddenly came to life and delivered fantastic game. The Dutch mostly tried to fence off Scottish attacks. Happel was still trying to find a working team – Haan was out and Rep was back. The rest were those from the match with Peru – and they were not great again. Most difficult was to figure out the worst player and substitute him in time – the candidates were too many... Neeskens was substituted in the 10th minute – by Boskamp, another nearing the age of 30 player, who hardly ever played for Holland before. After half-time Rijsbergen was no longer on the pitch either.

At first it was so bad – Rensenbrink scored, again from a penalty, in the 34th minute. But the Scots equalized just before half-time. Right after the start of the second half they scored again – from a penalty – and increased their attacks. In the 68th minute a fantastic attack of Gemmill ended with another goal and the end of Holland was quite at hand. Rep, however, reduced the Scottish lead two minutes later. The match ended 3-2 for Scotland and Holland qualified for the next round.

Not quite on their knees – or bums – but Holland was mostly trying to stop flying Scots. They survived , barely, thanks one more time to soldiering. No generals emerged so far... instead, some of the biggest names of the 1970s football were seeing themselves substituted or altogether benched. So far Holland was very disappointing and outright in trouble. It did not have well shaped team – rather, the search for some more or less effective combination of players continued. So far, Happel gave up on his preferred goalkeeper; gave up on his innovative 3-4-3 tactic; and desperately tried to find right place for Rensenbrink and Haan. After the match with Scotland it was very doubtful that Suurbier and Rijsbergen will be starters again. After his heavy injury in the match with Peru, Neeskens was probably out too. But Holland reached the second stage.

1. Peru 2 1 0 7-2 5

2. Holland 1 1 1 5-3 3

3. Scotland 1 1 1 5-6 3

4. Iran 0 1 2 2-8 1

1978

Cruyff was only the top of the iceberg of Holland's problems and scandals. 1978 was a carbon-copy of 1974: four years earlier the coach who qualified the national team to the World Cup was replaced by another for the finals. Exactly the same happened in 1978. Ernst Happel was contracted for the finals. Like Rinus Michels in 1974, Happel was heavy-handed disciplinarian, excellent tactician, and was under club contract at the beginning of his appointment, which made him an absent coach for awhile. Like Michel, he was big name at his coaching prime. Like Michels he was hired only for the World Cup finals – a short and particular contract. And just like Frantisek Fadrhonc was 'thanked' for qualifying Holland to the finals with demoting him to assistant of Michels, Jan Zwartkruis was rewarded in 1978. An absurd situation, nothing but trouble. Relations between Michels and Fadrhonc were non-existent. Michels did not even talk to his 'assistant', who really was a simple tourist at the finals. Relations between Happel and Zwartkruis were slightly better – they talked to each other and Zwartkruis had some functions. Precisely the functions of assistant coach – helping with the process, running training, following orders. There was no doubt who was in charge, just like in 1974. Naturally, it was great time for the press... Happel wanted to lead Holland for their last qualification match against Belgium and nice juicy scandal burst: the Belgian Federation sent a letter to their Dutch counter-parts, accusing Happel of unethical behavior. He was coaching FC Brugge, yes – Beligian club, at the time and suddenly appeared to be coaching two entirely different teams, with not just a hint of conflict of interests. The Ditch agreed that the Belgians were may be right, which immediately brought the other and entirely Dutch side of the same problem: Zwartkuis, also found the case of his replacement unethical and resigned. In fact, it was his second resignation, but the Federation had to act quickly, for out of the blue the national team was without a coach for the most important match. Zwartkruis was persuaded to come back – and stay under ridiculous title, which changed with time too. At first it looked like Happel and Zwartkruis were equal and were to lead the team together. But equality did not last even superficially and Zwartkruis's title eventually evolved. There was never any doubt about who was to going to run the show, no matter what the official title of Zwratkruis was.

There is no need of introducing the legendary coach. He was 53 years old, at his prime as a coach, already vastly experienced and successful, nearing the peak of his coaching abilities – and his career. Already one of the best European coaches and still going up. Heavy-handed coach of few words – going a bit ahead of time, his pep-talk to the team before the start of the World Cup finals was that: 'Gentlemen, two points.' When learning that Rinus Michels left Ajax for Barcelona, Piet Keizer jumped on a table and danced from joy – many a player was similarly happy to see Happel gone (although, more often gone was the player and not under celebratory circumstances). Happel was well aware that Holland needed – and in a very short time – to find new way of playing without Cruyff. Zwartkruis also had some ideas, which Happel perhaps was unwilling to explore. Of course, the circumstances were great for the journalists. At a press-conference, a clever man asked 'How does it feel for an Austrian coach of Belgian club to be at the helm of Holland?' 'I am already half-Dutch', Happel answered. The press appreciated the joke. No wonder Happel hated journalists – he practically built his coaching career in Holland, spending 10 years there, and leading Feyenoord to winning the European Champions Cup in 1970, the very first Dutch international success. He was, along with Michels, responsible for the great Dutch football revolution of the early 70s. All stars of Feyenoord became international stars thanks to him. He knew all the players very well – he either coached them, or played against them for years. And whole bunch of them played in Belgium, so the players, their characters, form, whims, abilities and deficiencies, were hardly unknown to him. The question was ridiculous – Happel had to solve real problems and made a team, not to discover the mysteries of Dutch football culture. And the problems were serious: Happel constantly repeated that he wants a team, not stars. A collective game, following his tactics, which depended on available players. The problem was to create workable tactical scheme for players used to be led by Cruyff. It was not an easy task in any aspect – especially for a team full of big stars.

Of course, replacing Cruyff was the central problem – for quite some time Rob Rensenbrink was seen as successor of Cruyff. After 1974 Rensenbrink developed into the leader of Anderelecht and his playing position somewhat evolved, becoming similar to Cruyff's. On top of everything Rensenbrink was physically similar to Cruyff. Zwartkruis saw him replacing Cruyff, taking his role - and therefore, a team and tactics should be organized around Rensenbrink. Happel accepted Zwarkruis's idea with caution. Rensenbrink was not game – he spoke against comparing him to Cruyff for at least an year. He emphasized that Cruyff is one thing, but Rensenbrink – another, and it was ridiculous to think of him as Cruyff's double. Rensenbrink was right – he was rather typical left winger. When he moved a bit back to midfield and took playmaking role, it was still limited and partial – mostly concentrated on the left side of the pitch, and shared with Arie Haan. Cruyff operated on the whole field and conducted everything – he was real playmaker, which Rensenbrink was not. But by 1978 he felt he may be able to take the playmaking position. May be. 'May be I can do it now.', said Rensenbrink, immediately cautioning: 'If the others help me, I may be able to replace Cruyff. The team is conditioned to pass every ball to Cruyff, he was he centre of everything. I am not sure the others will agree to pass me the ball the way they passed it Cruyff. It is not just a matter of willing – let's not forget that the national team was centered on Cruyff for so many years. Habits die hard.'

Rensenbrink was right to hesitate – and
Happel to be cautious about placing Rensenbrink into Cruyff's shoes. There was powerful opposition to Rensenbrink – those 'others' clearly did not see him as new Cruyff. Arie Haan, when asked about it, said that Cruyff was most important psychologically – his presence affected both teammates and opposition. Johan Neeskens: 'The Dutch style requires Cruyff. We start slowly and need Cruyff to change the tempo with his passes. With just a pass he is able to force the speed of our attack to such level, that the opposition is unable to keep up, and then it is easy to score.' Johnny Rep: 'Cruyff creates dangerous situations out of nothing. With him everybody shines; without him – unfortunately, not everybody.' The big stars emphasized the importance of Cruyff and evidently thought him irreplaceable. Rensenbrink was not mentioned at all – apparently, not worth considering, and the words contain not so veiled criticism of real and possible teammates. Haan, Neeskens, and Rep clearly were not even thinking of giving the ball to Rensenbrink and accepting him as new leader. Why should they, after all? They were world-famous stars even before him and when came to passing it was not all that sure that he was more creative than Neeskens or Haan. At least to hem, Rensenbrink was not. Van Hanegem was perhaps the better option – unfortunately, nobody was blind: the guy was getting old and slow. Rensenbrink was realistic – he was right to be careful, for he knew the boys well. Happel was also right in not pushing Zwarkruis's idea far – to really use it, a new team around Rensenbrink had to be created. There was no time for that – the best was low key tactical option with Rensenbrink in the centre, but one option among other weapons, an useful variety, not too heavily imposed on the team. No matter what, the situation was tense and explosive – difficult to deal with coach, having difficult to deal with players. It was a circus.

An early camp was scheduled, starting at May 8, 1978. 26 players were called. Only 16 arrived and presented themselves to... Zwartkruis, because Happel was absent too. The excuses were mostly plausible – some of the absentees, including Happel, had important club games. The players of PSV Eindhoven and Rep, playing for the French Bastia, were meeting each other at the final of the UEFA Cup. Happel had to play the the European ChampionsCup final – he was still the coach of FC Brugge after all. Neeskens called to say he cannot leave Barcelona, because of scheduled medical examinations by the club. Anderelecht's players were unavailable for stupidly early camp – Anderlecht had scheduled friendlies to play. And the home based players from AZ'67 Alkmaar just won the Dutch Cup and needed rest and/or relaxation after the final. Zwartkruis thought of canceling the camp and sending everybody home, but Ruud Krol strongly opposed that and insisted the camp was needed. Better having 16 players than nothing. The camp started... at first, Krol's insistence appeared to be responsible call. An early camp perhaps was most important psychologically – the turbulent personalities to get used to each other, the biggest troublemakers to leave on their own or be get rid of, and some modus operendi, some workable truce to be achieved between the rest and Happel. End even worse comes to worst, some time to be still at hand for calling somebody else and fitting him in. And along with that the post-Cruyff style of Holland to be developed, tried, and, with luck, even polished. Krol's example of responsibility made perfect sense, until the real reason was discovered: the President of Ajax demanded compensation from the Federation for his 6 players called to the camp, including Krol. His argument was 'fairness' – Ajax had to cancel friendlies because the players were not at hand. If Anderlecht and FC Brugge can keep their players and get away with it, it was only right Ajax to be compensated. At this point public opinion reached the lowest point – angry journalist pinpointed the guilty: 'If Holland play mediocre World Cup, it will be only because of the incompetence of the coaching stuff.' There was no organization at all, it was concluded. Thus, it became clear well in advance who will be blamed – and the sentence was prepared already. Curiously, pig-headed players and clubs were not blamed for anything. The time was running, however, and solutions were increasingly unlikely to be found. Happel finally appeared; players disappeared; some friendlies were played... last minute friendlies are generally light and not against serious opponents – fear of injuries is the main reason, and generally such games have only one point: refining of the main tactical scheme. But Holland had no serious team-building friendly played under Happel, so the last minute friendlies appeared almost a joke: two matches against FC Brugge. Both teams coached by him – what kind of work was that? Then the final selection was submitted to FIFA. Van Hanagem was out. No Cruyff, no van Hanegem... no playmaker? Rensenbrink? The national team was a hornet nest to the end – Hovenkamp left. Holland had to go to Argentina with only 21 players. May be less, for who knows what horror may come next? Purely football problems were coming into focus – they existed for a long time, but other scandals constantly obscured them. There was no time left and Holand was approaching peril. Weakenesse were pointed out from every side, a feast for critics. Happel continued to repeat 'reasonable' statements, adding nothing new to whatever he said before, and sounding increasingly rediculous – what getting better? When? The finals arrived, training was over. What he meant by 'we achieved something in the last friendlies'? 'Something'?! What does it mean 'We have to get rid of Cruyff's complex as soon as possible'? When? After the World Cup? What about during World Cup then? Happel was coming to the point of having no friends left. Finally, Happel was blamed for announcing his tactical scheme – the journalists omitted the 'little' fact that they pestered him with the question – which was with 5 men in midfield. How stupid to tell the world your tactics in advance! And forget about attacking football then...
1    GK  Piet Schrijvers                          15 December 1946 (aged 31)   16              Ajax
2    DF   Jan Poortvliet                            21 September 1955 (aged 22)  1               PSV Eindhoven
3    MF  Dick Schoenaker                      30 November 1952 (aged 25)   0               Ajax
4    DF   Adrie van Kraay                       1 August 1953 (aged 24)           13            PSV Eindhoven
5    DF   Ruud Krol                                 24 March 1949 (aged 29)         52            Ajax
6    MF  Wim Jansen                               28 October 1946 (aged 31)      50            Feyenoord
7    DF   Piet Wildschut                           25 October 1957 (aged 20)       1              Twente
8    GK  Jan Jongbloed                            25 November 1940 (aged 37)   19             Roda JC
9    MF  Arie Haan                                  16 November 1948 (aged 29)   24             Anderlecht
10  MF  René van de Kerkhof                 16 September 1951 (aged 26)   20            PSV Eindhoven
11  MF  Willy van de Kerkhof                  16 September 1951 (aged 26)  18            PSV Eindhoven
12  FW  Rob Rensenbrink                        3 July 1947 (aged 30)                34           Anderlecht
13  MF  Johan Neeskens                          15 September 1951 (aged 26)   38           Barcelona
14  MF  Johan Boskamp                           21 October 1948 (aged 29)       1            Molenbeek
15  DF  Hugo Hovenkamp                        5 October 1950 (aged 27)         7             AZ'67
16  FW  Johnny Rep                                 25 November 1951 (aged 26)    23          SEC Bastia
17  DF   Wim Rijsbergen                           18 January 1952 (aged 26)        25          Feyenoord
18  FW  Dick Nanninga                             17 January 1949 (aged 29)        1            Roda JC
19  GK  Pim Doesburg                              28 October 1943 (aged 34)       2            Sparta Rotterdam
20  DF   Wim Suurbier                               16 January 1945 (aged 33)        56          Schalke 04
21  FW  Harry Lubse                                 23 September 1951 (aged 26)   1            PSV Eindhoven
22  DF   Ernie Brandts                                3 February 1956 (aged 22)        1           PSV Eindhoven

The almost final selection... top, from left: Pim Doesburg, assistant coach Jan Zwartkruis, Dick Nanninga, Piet Schrijvers, Rene van de Kerkhof, Ernie Brandts, Piet Wildschut.
Middle row:Wim van Hanegem, Ruud krol, Arie Haan, Hugo Hovenkamp, Jan Poortvliet, Harry Lubse, Wim Rijsbergen, Willy van de Kerkhof, Johan Neeskens, Ernst Happel coach, Jan Jongbloed

Sitting: Rob Rensenbrink, Johnny Rep, Jan Boskamp, Wim Suurbier, Wim Jansen, Adri van Kraay

Van Hanegem and Hovenkamp still around. Soon to be gone, but Hovenkamp remained on paper. Some grumpy looking creature popping between Nanninga and Schrijvers – probably an official of some kind. At a first glance, sober looking bunch with significantly shorter hairs – the wild look of the 1974 team was gone, immediately suggesting aging... Holland was the team with the most players remaining from the 1974 World Cup – 12. By now, Holland had one of the largest numbers of foreign-based players among the finalists: 6. Times changed, though – back in 19774 the team was based on Ajax and Feyenoord. Now PSV Eindhoven had the most players – 6. No wonder why – both Ajax and Feyenoord faded, and PSV Eindhoven was the top Dutch team in the recent years. With that, plus inevitable aging and those out of the squad, style was slowly changing, going from flamboyant attack to physical toughness. Which suited Happel's approach to football.

This squad had weaknesses, some objective and without remedy for years. Goalkeeping – the most obvious. Happel preferred Schrijvers. During the qualifications 5 keepers were used and it was nothing new – van Beveren was the best Dutch keeper during the 1970s and the gap between him and the rest was enormous. Without him, there was not much to choose from. Perhaps Ruiter of Anderlecht was good choice, but he was hardly ever called. The rest were rotated, none satisfying, which explains why nobody had many appearances for otherwise long, very long years of participating in the national team. So Schrijvers and Jongbloed, like in 1974, plus Doesburg, as a last ditch insurance. All over 30 years old, the newcomer Doesburg was 34, yet, practically a debutant with his measly 2 national team games. It was not the age as such – goalies last and the older they get, the better they are as a rule – but these three did not get any better, they were mediocre keepers, and the scary point was that there was nothing promising among the youngsters. There was no choice really and the goalkeeping problem almost automatically required strong defense, especially for Cruyff-less team, no longer able to keep opposition at bay afraid of deadly Dutch attacks. Midfield was a bit bland – without Cruyff and van Hanegem creativity was at stake, inevitably. Rensenbrink, if used as playmaker, was somewhat limited to the left side of the pitch, making Holland predictable and easier to neutralize. The attack was more or less based on Rep and unfortunately whatever Holland had were doubles of Rep, but of lesser quality, or incompatible players. The team lacked creative strength – with van de Kerkhof twins it was more predictable, German-style physical game of prevailing over opponents, not outplaying them. Even if those who refused to play for Holland were in the team it was not going to be better – they mostly duplicated the starters. For the really weak posts there were no solutions.

On the positive side was experience and versatility. The main core knew each other well, they were still mostly from the great Ajax team of the early 1970s. They were intelligent and more than merely skilful. The weaknesses were compensated by tactical variety – there was no other team in the world able of various tactical schemes. Ruud Krol moved to the centre of defense by 1978, becoming a libero. But he was equally good as stopper and there was problem to place him at his original position as left full-back. Thus, Holland had options – three-men defense, with Krol in the middle; or four-men again with him conducting the line, or four-men with him at the left. There was Rijsbergen, who was improvised stopper in 1974, but became permanent one after that to help Rep, but, if needed, he was able to move to his old position of right full-back. Jansen and Haan were able to move back to the centre of defense too. Haan was incredibly flexible – depending on momentary needs, he would easily play defender, defensive midfielder, playmaker, centre-forward. Rensenbrink would be either midfield playmaker or left winger. The van de Kerkhof twins were equally capable of playing central role in midfield, or become wingers. Rep was fine as either centre-forward English type, or mobile lighter version of centre-forward, opening space for attacking midfielders, or a classic right winger. Even unknown newcomers were versatile – Ernie Brandts was initially called as striker, but in the final squad is listed as defender.

It seems Happel selected the team largely on the base of versatility, recognizing the tactical potentials of such squad. Which explains the absence of some names, even some of the refusals – they were either doubles of somebody else, or with counter-productive skills. This squad provided easily at least tactical schemes – one based on Ajax players: Krol – Neeskens – Haan – Rep, a skeleton, commanding the game, and collectively compensating the absence of Cruyff. Another formation could be based on Rensenbrink as playmaker, with Rep as centre-forward and the Kerkhofs at the wings. Tough, determined, a bit English-styled attacking line, competently supplied with balls and crushing the opposite defense. And still there was the option based on van de Kerkhof twins in midfield, more German-like domination of the middle of the field. Other schemes were also possible, but even these three varieties had additional sting – they would have been easily interchanged during a single match. Very likely that was what Happel had in mind when speaking of 'a team' – using his many stars in different roles, changing tactics often, adjusting to particular needs. Ideally, Holland would have been tremendously difficult opponent and quite a pleasure to watch. In reality, it was not so great, but still not far from the ideal, although changes were made out of desperation. Going a bit ahead, Holland was the only team in 1978 which used different tactical schemes at different matches.

The rest is trivia: like 1974, Holland in 1978 had players with different kits. It was only Cruyff back then, but three players now – would have been five, if Geels and van Hanegem stayed. Holland, like in 1974, was supplied by Adidas. Personal contract prevented Cruyff from using the team's kit and he played with his own , with 2 stripes, in 1974. Well, the famous Adidas stripes were really the problem – they were too much part of the kit to be avoided. Cruyff was followed by others after 1974 and van de Kerkhof twins and Nanninga were unable to play with Adidas in 1978. It was pure money and nothing else: the van de Kerkhofs had no conflict of interest when playing for their club PSV Eindhoven, using Adidas. The three stripes were fine there, but not when the twins played for Holland.

The Dutch still used 'strange' numbers – back in 1974 players were given numbers in alphabetical order. Except Cruyff, of course. Some decided to keep their 1974 number, others took new ones – Suurbier, Neeskens, Rene and Willy van de Kerkhof, Rep, Rijsbergen, Jansen, and Jongbloed kept their old numbers. Krol, Haan, Rensenbrink, and Schrijvers choose new numbers. At the end, Holland and Argentina had the most exotic numbers - their goalkeepers played with 5 – Fillol, and 8 – Jongbloed.

At the end of all trials and tribulations, Holland went to Argentina as one of the big favourites.

1978

Johan Cruyff – he was discussed for many months. Practically the whole nation begged him to play. Same nation was also quick to accuse him of complete lack of patriotism. Ernst Happel tried to persuade Cruyff to change his mind – and also said he did not need stars, but a team. At the end, Cruyff is still discussed and speculated about. There is no denying the simple fact he was needed by Holland and not only because he was the biggest star in the world: the real problem was the aging of the team without adequate replacements of the stars. His leadership was very important too. Naturally, Holland wanted to go far at the World Cup finals – and for this Cruyff was needed. But he refused to play and did not change his mind. And the mystery of 'why he did that' remains. The problem is Cruyff himself - he 'talked in riddles'. So is the conventional opinion, meaning his real meaning had to be guessed somehow. Meaning also interpreting his words, quite literally: Dutch journalists did not even joke, when saying for years that Cruyff did not know Dutch. In Spain a TV comedy show existed for years – may still does – based entirely on Cruyff's Spanish. Bitter, yet serious, journalists suggested for years that of the three languages Cruyff speaks his English is best. Football players are rarely good speakers, but Cruyff was special case: he often changed his mind in public and his linguistic skills were convenient excuse – he was misunderstood or not understood, and always ready – at a later date – to 'clarify' things. Since business was always on his mind, his 'relativism' is actually understandable: words largely depended on the current state of business options and propositions. Hence, 'riddles', 'misinterpretations', things 'clarified' years later, and so on – but what the truth was would be always a mystery. Instead of truth – competing versions, all somewhat plausible. Cruyff was talkative and opinionated – unfortunately, it would have been better for understanding, if he was not.

Back in the summer of 1975 Cruyff was invited to play in a friendly for Paris SG. 'Guest appearances' were nothing new or unusual, but after the match Cruyff chatted with the brass of the French club and verbally promised them to join Paris SG. He liked Paris, wanted to play for the club – so the story goes, apparently true enough, because Paris SG approached Barcelona with a proposal and expecting transfer negotiations. Barcelona appeared surprised by such proposal and flatly refused: Cruyff was not for sale. So, what did really happen? It is not even interesting to find out: the most important part of the story is linguistic – Cruyff was in a position to dismiss everything, because of misunderstanding. It could have been a mere polite talk – when asked about joining Paris SG, the star politely, as good manners require, said that, yes, he would be happy to play for the club. In general. One day. He did not mean 'right now', unfortunately, the French misunderstood and acted mistakenly. Such explaination was so obvious, that I think nobody even tried to hear it from Cruyff. After all, 1973 was still fresh memory – when Cruyff maintained for months that loves playing for Ajax and nobody else; he was not going anywhere – and the same time his negotiations with Barcelona were public knowledge, creating also very public tensions with the other Ajax' players. Press and hype, a word here, a word there – it was always more of a business tool, used to get a better deal. But the mystery remains – was it only business? After all, Cruyff knew the art of silence – many words he said willingly, but not about private matters. And not about really serious things. So why he did not play in 1978? Many versions exist.

According to the general – and most immediate to casual readers – source, the Wikipedia, Cruyff refused to play for political reasons. This version is perhaps the one entirely wrong. Cruyff was explicitly apolitical. He said it many times: politics have no place in football. And he was consistent practitioner: his only political stance was about Barcelona. He liked it there, but also it appears carefully calculated pose – his public 'love' of the city, giving his newborn son a Catalan name, his off-hand mentioning of Catalunia, his mockery of Real Madrid, his appearance for the controversial – and illegal by UEFA rules – 'national team of Catalunia'. He gave every sign of 'belonging', except the real political one: supporting the explosive independence issue. He always avoided real politics – but he also never missed a personal gain. The general political mood was strongly against the Argentinian military regime; to speak against it plausible – may be spoke 'in general' against it, when asked a direct question. May be he gave impression he was somewhat revolted by what was going on there. In any case, he was not dismissing or 'clarifying' political interpretation of his refusal. He just let it stay. It was convenient version, for it sounded plausible and confused critics a bit.

Retirement. Just after the end of the 1974 World Cup Cruyff said he was not going to play in 1978. He was going to help during the qualifications, but was all. The reason was age – he thought he will be too old and retiring. He was 31 in 1978 – hardly the end for a top player – but it looked like he was really quitting. His contract with Barcelona ended – it was not renewed, nor there were negotiations with other clubs. In the fall of 1978 a testimonial for him was organized – one of the most bizarre testimonials ever – between Ajax and Bayern. His last game. Well, he played 6 or 7 years more after his 'last match' – how to trust his words then? But it looked like he was seriously thinking of retirement in 1978 and changed his mind later. May be retirement was not very strong argument in the spring - playing one more tournament, postponing quitting for one or two months was hardly a big deal – but the cause was plausible too: he said it 4 years earlier and was true to his word.

Personal reasons. Family, tiredness, vacation – all goes together. For years players complained about playing at international tournaments: they were tired after a grueling season, they needed vacation and rest, a time with their neglected because of football families. Another month of competitive football was just too much – patriotism was fine, but they were people too. This is classic and eternal whine, quite plausible too – and reason for many players to refuse playing for their national teams. No player ever hesitate to tell the press how tired he is and how badly he needs wife and beach – just every other stiff, right? Why Joe, the plumber, is free to take vacation, but Joe, the footballer, must go to work and extra month? And with laughably little of no pay on top of that? Cruyff said so quite a few times as well – in the spring of 1978 he declared 'I have had enough!', which came close to both retirement and just needing a brake badly. Used to his 'riddles', the Dutch press was quick to bite back – 'Have had enough of money, or football?' Seemingly, of football... for tired as he was, he signed a contract with British TV to word as their commentator during the finals – along with Brian Clough.

But years later Cruyff reveled his 'true reasons': and they were personal. He suffered a brake-in in 1977, and his wife was under kidnapping threat. He got scared and concerned and decided to stay with his family. It was really tough time – even to keep it secret, as he did. The story is plausible enough for more than single reason: kidnapping was real threat during the terrorist 1970s. Given the Argentinian situation, political kidnapping of public figure like Cruyff – or his family – was very likely. On top of it Cruyff already had the scare – he received death threats when Ajax visited Buenos Aires in 1972 to play for the Intercontinental Cup with Independiente. Back then the coach of Ajax had to improvise security for Cruyff – Barry Hulshof was assigned to go everywhere with Cruyff as a bodyguard. In the same time Cruyff was really attached to and protective of his family – his personal life was guarded and hardly ever discussed in the press. There were practically no scandals in the yellow press. Whatever came to the general public was very clean image:

A typical photo of Cruyff's personal life – giving soccer lesson to his son Jordy.

This picture is perhaps the 'raciest' ever photo of Cruyff's private life – yet, a perfect 'happy family' shot.

No doubt, a lot was orchestrated and cultivated by him, but his family life was boring and conventional. There was no evidence to the contrary – Cruyff was a happily married man, dedicated and protective. Hence, unpleasant situations had to be avoided: like the scandal just before the 1974 World Cup final, when West German tabloid published 'sensational story' of massive orgy in the Dutch camp. Many girls, booze, wild behaviour, and Cruyff was the midst of it – the story eventually was proven entirely untrue, but Cruyff, according to witnessing teammates, spent hours on the phone trying to convince his wife the story and the pictures were fake. To many, this was the reason Holland lost the final – the pressure from the scandalous news affected the team, and particularly Cruyff was no able even to concentrate on the game, troubled by family concerns. Not wanting to risk family happiness seems entirely plausible in his case.

Business. Of course, Cruyff was always associated with business. He was always speaking with emphasis on business – and was ever ready to pose for anything suggesting money, no matter what criticism may be triggered by that. According to this angle of the saga, he tried to convince the Dutch federation to use new kit manufactured by his own firm. The Federation refused – and he refused to play at the World Cup. It is plausible story – jump-starting a new venture with high-profiled free advertisement: the magic Dutch national team, led by the Arch-magician himself. Televised across the world, reaching millions of viewers. Typical Cruyff – after all, he was charging for interviews for years. With time, a long list with detailed pricing was made – and readily presented to 'customers' – of everything from autographs to endorsement of products and TV adds. Cruyff was constantly criticized for that, but especially in Holland, he was understood and excused too: taking care of his own profit is plausible. Of course, Cruyff used all possible means to get what he wanted, including the press – many of his 'riddles' were uttered for business purposes: to influence ongoing contract negotiations in Cruyff's favour. He was not bellow veiled and not so veiled chantage, he was excellent manipulator and very shrewd negotiator. A moment from the 1974 World Cup was well remembered, particularly in the Dutch Federation: after winning against Bulgaria, Cruyff carefully studied the contract with a sponsor, paying a bonus for each goal scored by Holland. Then immediately went to claim – and received! - a bonus for the goal Krol scored in his own net. The contract did not specify the net... A small detail, trumped on his famous private kit, different from the one used by the national team. So wanting Holland to play with his own production in exchange for joining the team was very, very likely.

These were and are the mail lines, every one with variations. And often elements from different lines were combined, for everything was possible. The man himself still adds 'riddles', fueling the fire of speculations. But there is one more line, rarely mentioned and almost never analyzed thoroughly. It is purely sporting line: Cruyff refused to play for Holland because of Ernst Happel. Our hero never said anything suggesting such reason. Happel, on the surface, appeared willing to have Cruyff in the team. Yet, Happel did not make any special effort to change the mind of Cruyff, and the other master of 'riddles' said few words, easily interpreted as statements against Cruyff: Happel maintained that he needed a team, not stars, was one and another often repeated was that Holland need to get rid of 'Cruyff's syndrome'. Happel never elaborated what he meant by that, so one interpretation of his words easily stands for 'get rid of Cruyff'. Since there was nothing direct and personal, Happel' real meaning was and is open for any speculation – but his words were surely not warm or welcoming the superstar. As for Cruyff, his relations with coaches may be summarized into three groups: work together as equals; ignore them; and feud and get rid of them. Cruyff had huge influence on and off the pitch, he was excellent tactician, and great reading of the game. Michels let him do whatever he liked, listened to the player, followed his advice. Kovacz, Fadrhonc, Knobel – seemingly, they were ignored and Cruyff run the show. He clashed with Hennes Weissweiller, staged a boycott, and got the great coach fired at the end. But Ernst Happel was different animal – a conflict of two strong wills was inevitable, and Cruyff was going to lose the fight. Happel was not known for even considering players' opinions; he was not the man to be ignored; and it was impossible to get him fired – largely, because his contract was very short, only for the duration of the World Cup finals. The occasion itself worked against Cruyff - the World Cup is not the right place for scheming against the coach. Since Cruyff and Happel had different visions of the game, peaceful collaboration was very doubtful. A confrontation was most certainly to be won by Happel – and Cruyff would lose in disgrace. After all, Happel did not even blink when dismissing his own favourite player, Wim van Hanegem. Very likely neither man wanted to work with the other and the way things developed there was no need even to talk about it. Officially, neither said anything directly hinting of personal dislike – the most Happel said was 'With Cruyff, we have one kind of team; without him – another kind. What kind precisely? This remains to be figured out yet.' Cruyff was already in the past, let's see the future – may be Happel was saying that, but certainly nothing against Cruyff. Simply, no need to talk about him any more. Cruyff talked about other things, not touching Happel either – when he was officially a TV commentator, then it was different... but it was different job, requiring critical approach – anybody would agree on that.

So, Cruyff was out.

Waiving a 'good bye' to Barcelona's fans. Looked final and that was all that mattered. The single, simple fact – Cruyff was not going to play for Holland in Argentina. And he was consistent in one thing - he never expressed regrets for his decision.

1978

Holland last. It was perhaps the most discussed team before the 1978 finals. Favourites are always in the news, but the Dutch case is complicated, enigmatic, and still controversial after all the years. The team, the personalities, the approach, the politics, objective and subjective reasons – everything was enmeshed. It is even difficult to find a starting point for the mess. The Argentinian political situation created so much outrage, it was doubted that the country would be able to organize the World Cup. One side was concern about security of foreign teams and fans. The other side was doubt of Argentina's ability to organize agreeable structure: stadiums, transportation, and so on. And yet a third side was political – many countries founded the regime undesirable, to put it mildly. Of course, there was never clear distinction between the three sides of objections – the same people concerned for the security of their own objected 'strongly' the Argentinian military version of order. In short, foreign countries founded the daily presence of guns revolting, yet, wanted guns to guarantee the security of their players and tourists. A last minute replacement was looked for and Holland was the likelier option: peaceful country, developed, competent police, with enough stadiums and money to host the World Cup at short notice. Argentina was not replaced and Holland leaped to the opposite: from possibly hosting the finals to not participating in them at all. Holland was the only country, which, however briefly, seriously considered to withdraw from the finals for political reasons. Political objections were strong enough and a group of players refused to go to Argentina – refused to play for the Dutch national team at the finals. From this point is no longer possible to separate truth from fiction, real reasons from convenient excuses, and just causes from selfish interests. Scandals were nothing new inside the Dutch national team anyway. But the national team still was on the brink of not going to the World Cup – the last straw had nothing to do with the politics of the hosts, but with FIFA politics.


Football politics... Holland was moved from pool 1 – the top favourites, which were not to play against each other in the first stage, that is – and Italy was placed there. The reason of FIFA was business: Italy was most likely to get large attendance since large percentage of the Argentinians is of Italian descent. Paying customers, no less. The commercial wisdom went against the written and unwritten rules of same FIFA – Holland was the reigning vice-champion and ranked higher than Italy. Naturally, the Dutch protested and found support for their cause in the Federation of Peru. Whatever the real motivation of the Peruvians was – considering the murky South American football politics – it was noble and just reaction, to which at the end fate played a cruel joke on: Holland won the case and was returned to pool 1. The draw placed Holland and Peru in Group 4. As for Italy... FIFA still broke its own rules, ruling that Italy was to chose its own first stage group. With this the international problems of Holland ended and the domestic circus unfolded in full. The principal figures involved were especially gifted in enigmatic, unclear, double, and triple talk, spoke in riddles, changed their stories at later time, and the press actively contributed in making the events entirely mysterious controversies. Some problems existed for years, some were new, some repeated 1974. Back then the coach, who qualified Holland was replaced before the finals with Rinus Michels. Same thing in the spring of 1978 – Ernst Happel was appointed to lead the team, with Jan Zwartkruis, the man who qualified the team, 'promoted' to assistant of Happel, just like Frantisek Fadrhonc was made assistant of Michels. And once again the Dutch Federation chose heavy-handed disciplinarian and difficult to deal with coach to lead a team of mouthy, individualistic, and difficult to deal with players. On top of it Happel was eternally 'lost in translation' – nobody ever knew what language the coach speaks, for it was not a known language, but some private creation. Happel, however, spoke a lot and in length to journalists – the trouble was discovering what he meant. This elusive, not entirely human speech Happel shared with another main protagonist – Cruyff. To this very day anyone is guessing what was really on the minds of Happel and Cruyff – with little chance of establishing the truth, for the protagonist changed their own versions as time went, and often dismissed previous claims and statements as misunderstood and misrepresented. Zwartkruis contributed to the linguistic puzzle: to him belongs the gem describing Happel as treating his players "like footballers, not like people". You are free to find the meaning of this – an ironic joke? A praise? What does it mean at all?

Under the circumstances, tensions were only to grow. A group of players refused to play for Holland in Argentina. Then and now, it is always plural, suggesting big number, and motives go under the rubric 'political reasons'. When it comes to names 'the group' is hard to find – Johan Cruyff, of course. His absence dwarfed everything else, for it was most important and most debated, but he is not 'a group'. Under pressure, more names emerge... four more. However... there is evasive confusion about timing, stories at real time and at later 'clarifications'. As for reasons... still commonly they are asserted as political. Perhaps the key is entirely Dutch – this is a country proudly describing itself as outspoken, critical, debating, and... not respecting anybody else. 'Speaking one's mind even if unpleasant and critical of others' was a personal right, inevitably leading to constant frictions and confrontations in the national team. Most of the conflicts were personal or about money – even without convenient political excuse, everything was easily hidden under the labels 'democracy' and 'individualism', both looking plausible together. So... it is easier to name the 'refuseniks' than to unveil why they decided to stay home. Cruyff – he will be analyzed separately later – Jan van Beveren, Ruud Geels, Hugo Hovenkamp, and Wim van Hanegem. Hm... even simple naming is not simple, for van Hanegem's absence was and is as controversial and mysterious as Cruyff's. Hovenkamp left the team last – after Holland had to submit her final list of 22 players for the finals. There was no way to replace him after the squad was made official, his name stayed, but Holland went to Argentina with 21 players. Clearly, Hovenkamp was not politically motivated, for it would be absurd to discover nasty Argentinian reality so late. No wonder 'a group' sounds better than concrete names in terms of this famous 'political objections'. Hovenkamp was not exactly a regular national team player. With Krol playing at the same position, Hovenkamp was to keep the reserve's bench warm during the whole World Cup. Most likely he was offended by that and left.

A better moment for Hugo Hovenkamp – his AZ'67 just scored a goal!

And similar is the case of Ruud Geels – he never played a minute during the 1974 World Cup. In general, he played rarely for Holland and was facing another finals permanently at the bench. Speaking of the top scorer of the Ducth league... three years in a row. Objectively, he was duplicating Johnny Rep and there was no place for him among the starters. Sure... political objections to Argentinian Junta motivated him...

Ruud Geels delivers deadly header against Feyenoord in 1977.

Jan van Beveren? Officially, he was injured in 1974. Officially, he missed the 1976 European Finals and 1978 World Cup because of his feud with Cruyff. Which is true – Cruyff did not like van Beveren. It was and is suspected van Beveren used his injury for an excuse in 1974 – just to avoid quarrels with Cruyff. Missed 1976 for the same reason – but may be not even called? He played for Holland after 1974 and after 1976... yet never regularly, only now and then – but almost every other Dutch player of that time, Cruyff included, was like that. Depending on personal convenience, depending on likes and dislikes of coach and teammates. You may call it 'political convictions', may call it 'mood', may call it whatever you like – and will be neither right, nor wrong.

Long time heroes: van Hanegem, left, and van Beveren in the middle in old match between Feyenoord and Sparta Rotterdam. By 1978 van Hanegem was playing for AZ'67 Alkmaar and van Beveren for PSV Eindhoven.

Van Hanegem presents even bigger mystery: usually when 'the group of refuseniks' is unpacked, he is not named. Van Hanegem was part of the national team up to the moment of submitting to FIFA the final squad. On one hand, he and the goalkeeper Jongbloed are most fitting the political label: the Communist Party member Jongbloed and life-long antifascist, automatically placing him in the political left, van Hanegem. But apolitical Cruyff is usually named as protesting Argentina and van Hanegem and Jongbloed – not at all. Funny that, but this is only at the surface – dig deeper and you will never know... One version is that van Hanegem left the national team because the Dutch Federation did not satisfied his financial demands. So, money was at the bottom... or may be not. Another version is that Happel dismissed the player. This version is intriguing and even tragic: Happel coached Feyenoord to their European Champions Cup victory in 1970. Van Hanagem was the star of the team, a favourite of Happel. In turn, van Hanegem liked and praised Happel honestly. He was glad to have Happel coaching the national team. Two other members of Happel's Feyenoord were still chosen by Happel – Wim Jansen and Wim Rijsbergen. Both went to Argentina, but not van Hanegem. Since Cruyff was no longer in the team, van Hanegem seemed the obvious choice filling the gap and taking the vital role of playmaker, his playing position anyway. And another option was in the centre of defense, as a libero – just before the finals this was the role of van Hanegem, he was expected to be a regular, organizing the defense, Ruud Krol moved back to his initial left full-back position. Van Hanegem seemed essential player. Yet, Happel – so the story goes – told him he is no longer needed. Which hurt van Hanegem enormously – his favourite coach dismissed him, yet, maintaining van Hanegem was his favourite player. Yes, Happel liked him, but the star was too old and too slow...sorry. True, van Hanegem was no longer at his prime, he was not even playing for Feyenoord, but for smaller and unfancied AZ'67, he was 34 years old... but Jansen was also at the wrong side of 30 by now and Rijsbergen was not exactly shining in 1978. They were in, van Hanegem – out. Strange, but whatever the real story was, it was not political.

Of course, the biggest missing name was Cruyff, completing the 'group of political protesters', often the only named 'member', yet, even more separate a case than van Hanegem. Earlier absentee than any other, discussed for months, begged to come back, questioned constantly, ridiculed, excused, and accused by all and sundry. His case dwarfed everything else, shielding the rest of the 'refuseniks' – bulked together just because they refused, not because hey acted together and had common cause – from scrutiny, and entirely obscuring few others who were absent from the team at the end. The missing 'non-political' stars are practically never mentioned and in my opinion is interesting to contrast them to the 'political' absentees: Kees Kist (AZ'67), Johnny Dousbaba (Anderlecht, Belgium), Tscheu La Ling, Pim van Dord (Ajax), Frans Thijssen and Arnold Muhren (Twente), and Rene Noten (Feyenoord). The current Dutch stars, that is. All of them already played for the national team. All represented the 'next' generation, destined to replace the big stars of the early 1970s. Yet, the weight of the famous older stars was so great the above players were practically not mentioned: some too young for big tournaments, some not in great form, some not really better than even fading elders... but Kees Kist, Johnny Dousbaba, Tscheu La Ling, and Jan Peters (AZ'67) were in the 'large' national team as late as early May, 1978. None made the final 22 and may be none was really needed, save Kist – already top goalscorer, constant rival of Ruud Geels in the Dutch league, and considering the final selection of strikers and Geels' decision to leave the national team – may be a necessary player. Yet, he was out. To a point, those simply not selected were bigger loss than the so-called 'political refuseniks'. But making a working team is never simple compilation of names. A team made of the absentees looks impressive on paper – here is a version:

van Beveren

van Dord Dousbaba Hovenkamp ?

Thijssen van Hanegem A. Muhren

La Ling Cruyff Geels (Kist)

There are players for the bench as well, yet it is short team, made of not really compatible players. And Happel's selection would easily beat such concoction, for Happel's will be superior and well-oiled in every line, except goalkeeping. Which at the end is even impossible in reality, because of Cruyff's presence. And still a 'but' remains – in view of the above names, who on Earth were Dick Nanninga, Harry Lubse, Dick Schoenaker, Piet Wildschut, Jan Poortvliet, Ernie Brandts, and Pim Doesburg? And even better known at the time Johan Boskamp? Pros and cons may never end, obscuring the vital point: the absentees, with few exceptions, were destined to be reserves. The unknown among the selected were precisely the bench of reserves, some so deep, only a cataclysm of some kind would move them to the grass. At the end, the players really needed were van Beveren and Cruyff – and since they were mutually exclusive, only Cruyff was the big loss.

To a point, Peru's schedule was good – their first match was against the direct opponent, Scotland, and the last against the outsiders, Iran. Did the Scots took Peru seriously or not is immaterial – Peru was serious and well prepared. But they did not survived the initial Scottish rush and received a goal in the 14th minute. May this goal completely mislead the Tartan Army – Peru gained control of the game, did not look scared or discouraged, and shortly before halftime equalized. The turning point came in the 57th minute – Masson missed a penalty. Peru continued to attack and prevailed – Cubillas scored 2 goals between 70th and 80th minute and Scotland was down.

Cubillas delivered excellent free kick and scored – one of the outstanding goals of the finals.

Peru won their most important match, but it was only the first match. The next opponent was mightier – Holland. Holland was not overwhelming against Iran, so it was expected to play better this time. Peru was riding on the wings of enthusiasm, but prediction went for the Dutch anyway. In front of relatively small crowd of 28 000 spectators the teams clashed and the heroes were the Peruvians. A second strong match, more than equal to the Dutch.

Quiroga bravely gets the ball ahead of Rene van der Kerkhof. The goalkeeper was the hero this evening and proved to be not only brave, but really good keeper. But he was not alone – the whole team played well. The match ended in a scoreless draw.

The group became a Russian roulette – before the last leg nothing was decided: Holland and Peru had 3 points each and Scotland and Iran – one point. Given the shaky play of the Dutch, the uneven performance of the Scots, and the surprisingly competent Iranian team, everything was possible. True, Iran and Scotland needed big wins, but neither Holland, nor Peru could risk playing for a tie. Peru was strong again. Velasquez scored in the 2nd minute. Then in the 36th minute Peru got a penalty.

Cubillas scored the penalty and Peru was leading 2-0. Three minutes later the moment was repeated – another penalty for Peru and again Cubillas made it 3-0. Solid lead, Peru was the classier team, continuing to attack. But Iran was not giving up. They fought back and scored a goal in the 40th minute. 3-1 at halftime.

Peru did not lose concentration and did not try to kill the game and preserve the result in the second half. It was open, attacking match, in which only scoring was to secure victory. Eventually, Peru scored one more goal in the 78th minute. Cubillas again and 4-1. Nothing changed in the remaining time and Peru qualified for the next round. The team was one of the best in the first phase of the tournament. The midfield was particularly impressive – Cueto, Velasquez, and Cubillas. The defense was solid, led by the 'slow and over the hill' Chumpitaz. Quiroga was more than solid between the goalposts. The strikers were dangerous. Teofilo Cubillas was the leading scorer of the tournament so far with 5 goals. Peru was perhaps the most consistent team at the first stage and deserved to go ahead. And may be capable of doing more than that.